On September 29 the China Coast Guard announced that a task group led by the cutter Zhujiajian had carried out “routine law-enforcement patrols” in the waters east of Taiwan. The announcement added a detail that matters more than the patrol itself. The group, Beijing said, had been “strengthening control” over those waters since the start of September.

Taiwan’s coast guard had been watching. Its cutter Lanyu shadowed two Chinese ships, the Zhujiajian (hull 2503) and the Chongming (1401), and placed them roughly 97 nautical miles northeast of Green Island and 146 nautical miles east of Lanyu. Far from the Strait. Far from Fujian. On the Pacific side of the island, where Taiwan’s east-coast ports and air bases face open water.

Edgecore Networks, a subsidiary of Accton Group and a leading provider of open networking solutions, has unveiled outcomes of the Innovative Optical and Wireless Network (IOWN) all-photonics network application at the “AI IMPACT: Smart Cities and Southern Taiwan Achievement Showcase,” held under the guidance of Taiwan’s National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).

The demonstration was jointly presented by the National Center for High-performance Computing (NCHC), Chunghwa Telecom (CHT), and Accton Technology / Edgecore Networks, with participation from Japan’s NTT and Taiwan NTT Systems. The collaboration applies IOWN’s All-Photonics Network (APN) and photonic-electronic convergence technologies to realize low-power “IOWN photonic computing” use cases — marking a significant milestone in Taiwan–Japan cooperation toward sovereign AI infrastructure.

The Japanese contribution to a Taiwan contingency was, until recently, an open question. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibits the maintenance of war potential. The interpretation was strict for most of the postwar period and has loosened steadily since the early 2000s. The pace of loosening has accelerated in the last five years to a point where the formal constitutional position and the operational reality have diverged considerably. This is the most important development in the Western Pacific that does not get the attention it deserves.

The political consensus that Taiwan’s concentration of advanced semiconductor production represents a strategic vulnerability has produced a global effort to disperse that production — or at least to replicate enough of it elsewhere that a Taiwan Strait crisis does not produce a complete collapse of advanced chip supply. TSMC is building fabs in Arizona, in Kumamoto and Hokkaido in Japan, and in Dresden, Germany. Intel is building in Ohio and Germany. Samsung is expanding in Texas. The CHIPS Act in the United States, the European Chips Act, and Japan’s semiconductor subsidy programs have collectively directed tens of billions of dollars at this dispersal objective. The effort is serious, expensive, and insufficient on the timescale that matters most.

Stretching from Kyushu southwestward toward Taiwan, the Ryukyu island chain forms a natural barrier between the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea. The chain includes Okinawa — site of the largest American military concentration in the western Pacific — and continues through progressively smaller islands to the Yaeyama group, whose southernmost point lies less than 75 miles from Taiwan’s northeastern tip. This geography is not coincidental to the Taiwan question. It is central to it. Any Chinese military operation in the Taiwan Strait must account for the Ryukyu chain, and any American or Japanese response to such an operation would use the chain as its primary operating framework.

The Senkaku Islands — known as the Diaoyu Islands in China — are eight uninhabited islands and rocks administered by Japan in the East China Sea, approximately 170 kilometers northeast of Taiwan and 330 kilometers west of Okinawa. Japan claims sovereignty. China claims sovereignty. Taiwan also claims sovereignty, though Taiwanese governments have generally handled the claim with less assertiveness than Beijing. The islands have no permanent population and no inherent economic value beyond the fisheries and potential hydrocarbon resources in the surrounding waters. Their strategic value lies entirely in their position: they sit at the junction of Japan’s Ryukyu chain and Taiwan’s northern approaches, and whoever controls them controls observation and potentially military positions that are relevant to both the East China Sea competition and the Taiwan Strait contingency.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies published a major wargame analysis of the Taiwan Strait in January 2023. It ran 24 iterations of a Chinese invasion scenario, varying assumptions about Chinese military capability, American intervention, Japanese participation, and Taiwanese defense posture. The headline finding — that the United States and its allies could likely defeat a Chinese invasion but at very high cost — made international news. The details of the analysis were more nuanced and more alarming than the headline suggested. Understanding what the wargames actually show, and what they cannot show, is prerequisite to understanding the current state of Taiwan contingency planning.