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    <title>US-China Relations on Taiwan Strait</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Taiwan Paid for the War in the Gulf</title>
      <link>https://taiwanstrait.com/taiwan-paid-for-the-war-in-the-gulf/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;The war in the Strait of Hormuz is ending. The accounting for Taiwan has not yet begun.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Every resource consumed in the Gulf over the past weeks came from the same strategic account that underwrites deterrence in the Pacific. The aircraft carrier gap — no US carrier in the Pacific for more than two months — is not a logistical footnote. It is a signal. China read it. Taiwan felt it. The question now is what Beijing concludes about the durability of American commitments when a second crisis materializes in a different theater.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Balikatan Pressure, Summit Shadow: Taiwan Strait Developments</title>
      <link>https://taiwanstrait.com/balikatan-pressure-summit-shadow-taiwan-strait-developments/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 02 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;The past 48 hours in the Taiwan Strait are best understood against two converging pressures: the ongoing Balikatan 2026 exercises reshaping the military geometry of the first island chain, and the approaching Trump-Xi summit that has introduced a layer of calculated restraint — and calculated anxiety — into Beijing&amp;rsquo;s Taiwan posture.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Balikatan and the PLA response.&lt;/strong&gt; The combined Balikatan 2026 exercises, running April 20 through May 8, mark a structural inflection. Japan is participating for the first time in an active operational role, not merely as an observer. The exercise has prominently featured sea denial systems — the US Navy-Marine Corps NMESIS and Japan&amp;rsquo;s Type 88 anti-ship missile — deployed to the Batanes Islands in the Luzon Strait. The positioning is deliberate: anti-ship systems in the Batanes directly contest the PLAN&amp;rsquo;s primary breakout route from the first island chain through the Luzon Strait. Beijing read it accordingly. The Southern Theater Command announced on April 24 that a surface task group led by a Type 055 guided missile destroyer, accompanied by a Type 052D destroyer, a Type 054A frigate, and a replenishment vessel, had conducted exercises east of Luzon. The STC conducted additional South China Sea exercises on April 28, citing Philippine provocations. Unverified satellite imagery circulated on PRC social media appeared to show the carrier Liaoning operating in the South China Sea with a three-destroyer, six-frigate escort group — Liaoning had transited the Taiwan Strait southbound on April 20. Separately, the PLAN&amp;rsquo;s new Type 076 landing helicopter dock departed Shanghai for sea trials in the South China Sea around April 22, possibly in conjunction with the response posture. The PLA also released footage of YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile test launches, timed to coincide with the Balikatan peak, including previously unseen shots of the launch sequence beyond what was disclosed in December.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Singapore&#39;s Tightrope: The City-State That Cannot Afford to Choose</title>
      <link>https://taiwanstrait.com/singapores-tightrope-the-city-state-that-cannot-afford-to-choose/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://taiwanstrait.com/singapores-tightrope-the-city-state-that-cannot-afford-to-choose/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Singapore&amp;rsquo;s founding prime minister Lee Kuan Yew described his country&amp;rsquo;s strategic situation as that of a small nation living in a dangerous neighborhood, whose survival depends on making itself indispensable to every major power simultaneously. His successors have maintained this framework with considerable sophistication. In the context of the Taiwan Strait, it produces a position that is carefully calibrated to avoid giving either Washington or Beijing grounds to treat Singapore as aligned with the other: Singapore maintains deep security cooperation with the United States, hosts American naval vessels at Changi Naval Base, allows American surveillance aircraft to operate from Paya Lebar Air Base, and simultaneously maintains an economic and diplomatic relationship with China that it regards as equally essential to its prosperity and security.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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