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    <title>AUKUS on Taiwan Strait</title>
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      <title>Australia&#39;s Taiwan Calculation: The Ally Closest to the Conflict That Least Wants to Name It</title>
      <link>https://taiwanstrait.com/australias-taiwan-calculation-the-ally-closest-to-the-conflict-that-least-wants-to-name-it/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Australia&amp;rsquo;s relationship with the Taiwan question is defined by a gap between its strategic reality and its public political language. The strategic reality is that Australia is a treaty ally of the United States, a member of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership, a signatory to AUKUS with its consequent nuclear submarine commitment, and a country whose trade relationships, geographic position, and alliance obligations make it impossible to remain neutral in a Taiwan Strait conflict that involves American military action. The public political language has been more cautious, with Australian leaders consistently declining to state explicitly what they would do in a Taiwan contingency, preferring instead formulations about supporting the peaceful resolution of the dispute and avoiding statements that could be read as provocation by Beijing.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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